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Abstract—Many aspects of our lives are dependent upon the
Web. Research that considers how we can better protect the Web
and the products and services delivered using it–that is research
into Web Security–is therefore of the upmost importance. Conse-
quently, this paper considers evolutionary algorithms and their
potential (which is to tap into and harness the power of natural
evolution) within the field of Web Security. The paper provides a
concise overview of existing studies that have used evolutionary
algorithms as a tool within Web Security. More specifically, the
paper considers the manner in which evolutionary algorithms
have been applied, the types of problems that they have been
applied to, and the way in which they have been assessed or
evaluated. Furthermore, an opportunity to better harness the
power of natural evolution within the field of Web Security, by
applying modern evolutionary algorithms that draw inspiration
from the open-ended aspect of natural evolution, is highlighted
and discussed.
Index Terms—web security, evolutionary computation, SQL
injection, cross-site scripting, open-ended evolution
I. INTRODUCTION
The Web is an intrinsic part of society and utilised by
a variety of organisations. Naturally, the services these or-
ganisations provide via the Web are an appealing target
for malicious actors that will look to exploit a myriad of
potential vulnerabilities [1], [2] for personal gain. A fact
that is demonstrated by the recent Internet Security Threat
Report from Symantec [3]. The importance of Web Security
as a research area is therefore paramount. Research into Web
Security facilitates the creation of new technologies that have
the potential to minimize the inherent risks associated with
the Web, such that we can ultimately achieve a safer and
more secure Web.
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are algorithms studied
within the field of Evolutionary Computation that mimic the
process of natural evolution, typically by implementing mu-
tation, crossover and selection operators [4]. They are often
thought of as a general approach that can be applied to solve
many different difficult optimisation problems [4]. However,
there is an emerging argument that the true potential of EAs
is best realised beyond the context of straightforward opti-
misation [5]–[12]. This viewpoint has motivated the design
of several modern EAs that draw inspiration from the open-
ended aspect of natural evolution and resemble conventional
machine learning algorithms less than their predecessors [5]–
[12].
Motivated by the aforementioned modern EAs, this paper
considers both the fields of Web Security and Evolutionary
Computation and searches for untapped potential where they
intersect. The underlying supposition that drives this work is
that the divergent quality of modern EAs is desirable in Web
Security and can be used to overcome some of the challenges
faced within this important field.
To investigate the potential of EAs in Web Security this
paper first considers preexisting studies in this area. More
specifically, it attempts to establish: the approaches that
have been used when applying EAs within Web Security,
the purposes for which EAs have been applied within Web
Security, and the way in which the EAs have been evaluated
within the context of Web Security. It achieves this via a
concise narrative literature review that is presented in section
III. Section IV builds on this review and explores a particu-
larly promising area of untapped potential–the application of
modern EAs to problems within the field of Web Security.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Web Security
In terms of security, the Web is a fast changing battle-
ground. Malicious actors are always looking to find and
exploit new vulnerabilities whilst those tasked with securing
our online services look to stay ahead of them. Web Security
has therefore long been, and will likely continue to be, a
highly active research area with an ever-changing landscape.
In our increasingly app-driven world resources produced by
the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) can be
used to ascertain the most prevalent issues in Web Security.
According to OWASP injection flaws, flaws that enable cross-
site scripting, and broken authentication and authorisation
mechanisms are some of the most prevalent vulnerabilities on
the Web [1], [2]. Much of the recent research in Web Security
relates to these vulnerabilities. For example, a number of
studies, that are of particular relevance to this study, introduce
testing techniques designed to help expose injection and
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities [13]–[21]. The following
subsections therefore consider these two vulnerabilities in
more detail.
1) SQL Injection: An injection vulnerability usually oc-
curs when a web server trusts and executes commands or
queries using input from untrusted sources. Malicious actors
can exploit injection vulnerabilities to cause the web server
to execute malicious commands, which could have a huge
impact on an organisation and result in data loss, disclosure
to unauthorized parties, or denial of access [1], [2]. SQL
injection is arguably the most well known type of injection
but other forms, such as NoSQL Injection and Command
Injection, pose a similar threat [1], [2].
An SQL Injection occurs when a web server does not filter
a user’s input and feeds it directly into a SQL statement.
Practically, this often occurs when SQL statements are formed
via string concatenation, like in the following example:
sqlStatement = "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE Name = ‘" + userName + ’;"
The example shows a user input userName variable being
used to form a SQL statement via string concatenation. If a
malicious actor entered ’ OR ’1’=’1’ -- as an input and
this was assigned to the userName variable, the assignment
to the sqlStatement variable would be equivalent to the
following:
sqlStatement = "SELECT * FROM Users
WHERE Name = ’’ OR ’1’=’1’ -- ’;"
This is problematic as although a valid query has been
assigned, the query does more than the author of the code
intended. The OR ’1’=’1’ clause will always be true
and allows for the original condition to be bypassed. The
vulnerability could therefore be exploited by a malicious actor
such that they retrieve all of the data associated with all of the
users in the database, which would of course be extremely
damaging to any organisation.
2) Cross-Site Scripting: According to OWASP [22],
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks involve the injection of
malicious scripts into otherwise benign and trusted web sites.
XSS attacks rely on subtle vulnerabilities being present in
victim websites. XSS attacks occur when a malicious actor
uses a flawed but otherwise legitimate web application to send
malicious code, typically in the form of a browser script, to
a different end user. Web application flaws that allow these
attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur whenever
a web application includes input from one user in generating
its output for another user without validating or encoding it.
A malicious actor can exploit a XSS vulnerability to send
a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The victim user’s
browser has no way of knowing that the script should not
be trusted, and will execute it. The scope of the malicious
script is almost limitless. The victim’s browser has no way
of knowing that the script should not be trusted and allows
it access to cookies, session tokens, or any other sensitive
information that it retains.
Formjacking attacks involve the theft of credit card details
and other information from payment forms. The type of
attack–visualised in figure 1–has recently been highlighted
Fig. 1: The stages of a formjacking attack in which a
malicious actor exploits a cross-site scripting vulnerability
to steal payment details.
by Symantec in their recent Internet Security Threat Report
[3] and can be considered a type of XSS attack. In their report
Symantec claim to have blocked over 3.7 million formjacking
attempts in 2018 [3] and thereby highlight the prevalence of
XSS.
B. Evolutionary Computation
Evolutionary Computation is a broad research area in
which the process of natural evolution is considered in a
computational context. It can more or less be thought of as a
spectrum, with studies that examine artificial life simulations
at one end, and studies that examine the application of
evolutionary algorithms to real-world problems at the other.
Many studies within the field of Evolutionary Computation
lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum and propose
new algorithms inspired by some aspect of natural evolution.
A simplified canonical EA is shown in algorithm 1. It
shows the application of variation operators, such as mutation
and crossover operators, to produce offspring subtly different
to their parents at each generation. It then shows the com-
bined population of parents and offspring being evaluated.
In practice, this evaluation is implemented using a domain
specific objective function, which is sometimes referred to
as a fitness function. Finally, it shows the best individuals,
according to the objective function, being selected using a
selection mechanism, and then used to create the population
of the next generation.
Of course, the EA shown in algorithm 1 is simplified
and very general. In practice, EAs can often be hard to
implement. One problem is that the variation operators can be
hard to design if the problem under consideration cannot be
represented in a well understood manner. Another problem,
perhaps more fundamental, is that an effective objective
function can often be difficult to craft without a highly
detailed understanding of a problem domain [5], [6].
Algorithm 1 A simplified canonical EA. Inspired by Back,
Hammel, and Schwefel [4].
1: procedure EA(max)
2: t := 0
3: initialize P (t)
4: evaluate P (t)
5: while t 6= max do
6: P ′(t) := variation [P (t)]
7: evaluate [P ′(t)]
8: P (t+ 1) := select [P ′(t)]
9: t := t+ 1
10: end while
11: end procedure
Despite the difficulties than can be encountered when
implementing them, research into EAs has continued as the
(apparently) astounding power of natural evolution as an
optimizer holds its allure. However, the power of natural
evolution has so far remained elusive and EAs are often
criticized as their performance rarely compares with that of
other optimisation algorithms [4]. This fact has contributed
towards a relatively recent paradigm shift within the field
of Evolutionary Computation. This paradigm shift has seen a
rise in modern EAs that draw inspiration from the open-ended
aspect of natural evolution and focus more on divergence,
compared to traditional EAs that focus more on converging
towards a global optimum (this is the best case scenario at
least) [5]–[12].
Open-ended evolution is complex and not well understood–
it is a grand question that will require many different fields to
coalesce before it is fully understood [23]. The modern EAs
that draw inspiration from the open-ended aspect of natural
evolution can therefore be viewed as a part of a larger quest
to fully understand the open-ended evolution phenomenon.
As modern EAs are applied to more and more problems the
generality and power of the mechanisms they employ will
become increasingly apparent. If a mechanism is shown to
be particularly general and powerful in this way, it could be
argued that similar mechanisms drive natural evolution and
other open-ended processes.
III. EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS IN WEB SECURITY:
CURRENT LANDSCAPE
There is an emerging trend to apply evolutionary algo-
rithms to Web Security problems. This section therefore
attempts to answer three research questions, which are stated
at the beginning of each subsection, by analysing the relevant
preexisting literature. By doing this it aims to provide clarity
across these two research areas and identify ways in which
both can be advanced.
TABLE I: A summary of how EAs have been implemented,
applied, and examined within Web Security.
Legend: T - traditional single-objective optimisation; M -
multi-objective optimisation; I - applications related to SQL
injection; X - applications related to cross-site scripting; N
- not compared to an alternative approach; R - compared
to a random search; ... - other approach, application, or
assessment.
Studies Approach Application AssessmentT M ... I X ... N R ...
[13], [14] X X X
[15] X X X
[16] X X X
[17] X X X
[18] X X X
[24], [25] X X X
[26] X X X
[19]–[21] X X X
[27], [28] X X X
[29] X X X
[30] X X X
Total 11 3 2 3 6 7 4 5 7
A. Approaches to Evolutionary Algorithms in Web Security
RQ1: What approaches have been used when applying
EAs within Web Security?
Table I reports that 11 out of 16 surveyed studies imple-
mented a traditional EA, where traditional EA refers to an
EA that searches with a single objective in mind. One of
these studies is worth briefly differentiating from the others
here as it uses human input to guide a search (interactive
evolution) [24]. The table also reports that 3 of the 16 studies
implemented a multi-objective EA that searched for multiple
Pareto optimal solutions. Finally, it reports that 2 of the
16 studies implemented an EA that can be categorized in
a different way, in both cases these studies implemented a
co-evolutionary algorithm.
The findings summarized in table I therefore suggest that
much of the research regarding EAs in Web Security has,
so far, not been particularly concerned with regards to the
underlying EA that is used. The studies that implement tra-
ditional single-objective EAs best demonstrate this, however,
the observation also applies to the studies that implement
multi-objective EAs as all of these use NSGA-II as their
underlying EA, when it could be argued an alternative such as
ParEGO may be more appropriate given that solutions within
a Web Security domain will most likely be computationally
expensive to evaluate [31]. A similar observation has been
made regarding the application of EAs for unit test generation
[32].
The apparent lack of attention that has been given to the
underlying EA highlights a promising research direction, one
that the 2 studies implementing co-evolutionary algorithms
have arguably already begun to explore. By drawing inspi-
ration from the latest research in the field of Evolutionary
Computation it seems likely that better solutions within the
field of Web Security can be achieved. Modern EAs that draw
inspiration from the open-ended aspect of natural evolution
seem particularly promising in this regard (see section IV).
Intuition suggests the divergent aspect of these modern EAs
will lend itself to test data generation within Web Security,
where there is a need to find multiple input vectors that
expose real vulnerabilities.
B. Applications of Evolutionary Algorithms in Web Security
RQ2: For what purposes have EAs been applied within
Web Security?
Table I reports that 3 out of the 16 studies have applied
EAs within the context of SQL injection, 6 have applied them
within the context of cross-site scripting, and 7 have applied
them to other areas of Web Security. Of the 7 studies applying
EAs to other areas of Web Security 3 focus on spam email
[25], [27], [28], 1 focuses on XML injection [29], 1 targets
published vulnerabilities in a server program [30], 1 considers
denial-of-service attacks [26], and 1 generates CAPTCHAs
[24].
Table I therefore suggests that EAs have been applied to
a reasonable variety of Web Security problems. Having said
that many of the applications are similar in the sense that they
generate test data to expose a particular type of vulnerability.
Further research could therefore consider whether EAs can
be meaningfully applied within Web Security for purposes
other than test data generation.
C. Assessments of Evolutionary Algorithms in Web Security
RQ3: How have EAs been assessed and examined when
applied within Web Security?
Table I reports that 4 out of the 16 studies did not compare
their implementation to an alternative, 5 sanity checked their
implementation against a random search, and 7 compare their
implementation to some other alternative (often an alternative
already sanity checked against a random search). The use of a
random search as a sanity check is sensible [33], particularly
when an EA is being applied in a new context, and it could be
argued that the 4 studies not comparing their implementation
could be improved by drawing comparisons against a random
search. It could also be argued that more should be done to
compare EAs to state-of-the-art approaches within the field
of Web Security.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS IN WEB SECURITY:
UNTAPPED POTENTIAL
The review presented in section III highlights an area
of untapped potential with regards to the application of
evolutionary algorithms in the field of Web Security. Broadly
speaking, this area of untapped potential can be explored
through the application of modern evolutionary algorithms–
that draw inspiration from the open-ended aspect of natural
evolution and focus on divergence more than traditional EAs–
within the field of Web Security. This exploration could lead
to new techniques and technologies that make the Web safer
and more secure. Additionally, because the exploration will
involve the application of modern EAs to new problems, it
will help determine the generality and power of the mecha-
nisms employed by these EAs and thereby contribute towards
the grand quest to understand open-ended evolution.
The following subsections therefore provide brief descrip-
tions of several notable modern EAs, discuss their potential
applications within the field of Web Security, and thereby
begin to answer this final research question (which will be
investigated further in future work):
RQ4: What is the potential of modern EAs within Web
Security?
A. Novelty Search
The original Novelty Search algorithm, proposed by
Lehman and Stanley in 2008 [5], abandoned the search for an
objective entirely and instead searched for novelty. It achieved
this by replacing the fitness function traditionally employed
by evolutionary algorithms with what is termed a novelty
metric. This novelty metric is essentially a special fitness
function that measures how different new solutions are in
comparison to past solutions, whereas a traditional fitness
function measures progress towards a given objective. Given
that it abandons the traditional notion of fitness entirely,
Novelty Search can be thought of as the canonical example
of a divergent search algorithm.
The divergent nature of Novelty Search lends itself to
test data generation and several studies have investigated its
potential in this area. However, none of the studies considered
in this paper use Novelty Search to generate test data within
the field of Web Security. There is therefore an opportunity to
investigate Novelty Search as a tool for test data generation
within the field of Web Security, but the fruitfulness of such
investigations remains to be seen. The fact that Novelty
Search abandons the traditional notion of fitness entirely
means it can get ‘lost’ in large search spaces and alternative
divergent search algorithms that reintroduce fitness in some
form may prove to be a better option.
B. Novelty Search with Local Competition
As its name suggests, Novelty Search with Local Com-
petition (NSLC) is a variant of the original Novelty Search
algorithm that reintroduces the notion of fitness via local
competitions. The algorithm aims to produce good solutions
across a range of diverse niches [7]. The NSLC algorithm
has been cited as the first in a new class of algorithms,
referred to as quality diversity algorithms [10]. Other quality
diversity algorithms, such as the Multi Dimensional Archive
of Phenotypic Elites algorithm (MAP-Elites) [8], operate in
different ways but similarly hope to achieve a diversity of
high quality solutions in a single run.
It seems clear that NSLC and other quality diversity
algorithms have something to offer the field of Web Security.
This is perhaps best demonstrated by considering the work of
Avancini and Ceccato [13], who apply a traditional EA to find
solutions to different path predicate expressions–an act known
as path sensitization. Avancini and Ceccato had to apply their
EA multiple times to find solutions to different path predicate
expressions [13], whereas a quality diversity algorithm could
potentially be applied just once and find solutions to many
different path predicate expressions. This suggests that quality
diversity algorithms, like NSLC, could prove to be useful
tools with regards to path sensitization (and therefore useful
tools that could help reduce the risk of SQL injection or XSS).
Figure 2 hopes to illustrate this potential by highlighting the
parallels between an asymmetric gauntlet domain designed
explicitly to examine quality diversity algorithms [10] and
a simple control flow graph, which is the type of domain
considered by Avancini and Ceccato [13]. The key similarity
between the domains being that both have multiple paths
that can be travelled in order to find different valid solutions
(in the control flow graph domain these valid solutions are
highlighted by the yellow nodes and equate to test data the
causes a vulnerable path to be traversed).
We have already begun investigating the potential of qual-
ity diversity algorithms as a tool to find multiple solutions
to path predicate expressions (and therefore as a tool to
improve the security of the Web). We have implemented
an instrumented web API that contains probes on branches.
Whenever the instrumented web API responds to a request
it includes information with regards to which probes have
been triggered in its response, which can then be used to
infer the logic that has been executed by the web API (or
the path that has been taken through the control graph). We
have also begun implementing the quality diversity algorithm
that will generate the requests, or test data, that will be sent
to the web API. We intend to describe our approach more
thoroughly and report empirical results in a future study.
C. Minimal Criterion Coevolution
The Minimal Criterion Coevolution (MCC) algorithm
evolves a population of solutions alongside a population
of problems [11]. To apply MCC in a given domain two
minimal criterion–something that must be satisfied in order
for a problem or solution to reproduce–must be defined [11].
For the population of problems this minimal criterion should
be defined with respect to the solutions and vice versa [11].
For example, when Brant and Stanley introduced MCC they
evolved mazes alongside agents tasked with solving these
mazes, the mazes had to be solved by at least one solver to
satisfy their minimal criterion, and the agents had to solve at
least one maze to satisfy theirs [11].
The fact the Brant and Stanley observed the evolution
of increasingly complex mazes and therefore inferred the
evolution of increasingly complex solvers in their original
study highlights the immense potential of MCC and subse-
quent approaches, such as the Paired Open Ended Trailblazer
(POET) algorithm [12], as tools within the field of Web
Security [11]. Again, this potential is best demonstrated by
Fig. 2: A side by side comparison of the asymmetric gauntlet
domain put forward by Pugh, Soros, and Stanley [10] (top)
and an illustrative control flow graph (bottom).
considering an example. Appelt, Nguyen, Panichella, and
Briand propose and examine a highly sophisticated (but
nonetheless traditional in the sense that it is not directly
inspired by aspects of open-ended evolution) EA, named ML-
Driven, capable of testing web application firewalls [15]. The
quartet also consider how the attack patterns found by ML-
Driven could be used to repair web application firewalls [15]
and thereby highlight a potential application of algorithms
like MCC and POET within the field of Web Security–
they could be used to achieve increasingly sophisticated SQL
injection attacks alongside increasingly sophisticated web
application firewalls.
V. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the emerging trend of modern evolutionary
algorithms (EAs) this paper has presented the findings of
a search for untapped potential at the intersection of Web
Security and Evolutionary Computation. It has given a brief
narrative overview of preexisting studies that apply EAs
within the field of Web Security. Further research could of
course build on this by conducting a review that is more thor-
ough and systematic. Nonetheless, meaningful conclusions
and directions for future research have been identified.
The most significant of these conclusions is that much of
the research regarding EAs in Web Security has not been
particularly concerned with regards to the underlying EA that
is used and that there is a great deal of untapped potential
in this area. Section IV constitutes a preliminary exploration
that begins tapping into (just some of) this potential. This
preliminary exploration suggests that further work in this
direction would be beneficial and we therefore intend to
conduct further research along these lines. The purpose of this
new research will be twofold: with regards to Web Security
its ultimate purpose will be to facilitate the achievement of
a safer and more secure Web, with regards to Evolutionary
Computation its ultimate purpose will be to contribute to-
wards our understanding of open-ended evolution.
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